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Executive Summary
We use data across states to examine the relation between HMO enrollment
and medical spending. We find that increased managed care enrollment sig-
nificantly reduces hospital cost growth. Although increased spending on phy-
sicians offsets some of this effect, we generally find a significant reduction in
total spending as well. In analyzing the sources of hospital cost reductions, we
find preliminary evidence that managed care has reduced the diffusion of
medical technologies. States with high managed care enrollment were technol-
ogy leaders in the early 1980s; by the early 1990s those states were only average
in their acquisition of new technologies. This finding suggests managed care
may significantly affect the long-run growth of medical spending.
Over the past few years, health insurance costs have made a dramatic
turnaround. After decades of double-digit increases, health insurance
cost growth has essentially ground to a halt. Most observers point to
managed care as the leading culprit. "The growing dominance of
managed care has helped control health care cost increases," the New
York Times editorialized. "What this demonstrates is that in the private
sector, managed care and competition are lowering the rate of cost
increases in health care," Representative Nancy Johnson stated.
But the evidence on this point is far from compelling Some surveys
find that managed-care premiums are not much lower than traditional
David M. Cutler is Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and Research Associate,
National Bureau of Economic Research. Louise Sheiner is an Economist at the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. We are grateful to Anna Long at the Health
Care Financing Administration for providing us with state medical spending data and
Victor Fuchs for helpful comments. This research was supported by the National Insti-
tute on Aging and the Commonwealth Fund through grants to the NBER. This paper
does not necessarily reflect the views of the members or staff of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve.78 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
indemnity premiums (Krueger and Levy 1996), so the savings from
enrollment shifts to managed care alone may not be that great. Further,
managed-care enrollment in many parts of the country is still very low.
Finally, the growth of public health programs has slowed as well
with both Medicare and Medicaid growing more slowly over the past
few years than over the previous decade. Medicare has little managed-
care enrollment, and although some have pointed tothe growth of
managed care as responsible for less-rapid cost growth in Medicaid,
initial analysis indicates this was not the primary factor (Holahan and
Liska 1997).1
And even if managed care is the answer, it is not clear whether this
reduced rate of cost growth can continue. Continued excess capacity in
the health system bodes well for future managed-care cost reductions.
Hospital occupancy rates, for example, which were 78% in 1980, were
66% in 1995, even with a 12% reduction in hospital beds. In the
presence of excess capacity, managed-care insurers find it easier to
bargain among providers and achieve overall lower rates. But there is
some concern that the increasing consolidation of themedical care
sector may reduce the ability of managed-care insurers to bargain
among providers.
More fundamentally, however, managed care may not be addressing
the right problem. Managed-care insurers may lower the rates paid for
particular services and may even chip away at the margins of medical
carefor example, in reduced hospital stays. But the fundamental
drivers of medical costs in the next several decades will be aging and
medicine's expanding technological capability. The latter factor in par-
ticular has accounted for the bulk of the growth of medical costs
historically, and it is not clear that managed care has done, or can do,
much about this. Managed care may save money, but how much and
for how long?
In this chapter, we examine whether managed care has affected the
growth of medical costs, and if so, whether that effect will continue or
slow down. We take advantage of the dramatic variation in the medical
insurance environment across states. Managed care is the dominant (if
not the only) source of medical insurance in some states; in California,
for example, close to 80% of the population is enrolled in managed
care. In other states, such as Alaska or Wyoming, managed care is
1. For example, growth in spending for the elderly and the blind (who are generally
not enrolled in managed care) fell more than spending for children and adults.Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures 79
virtually nonexistent. This variation in managed-care penetration pro-
vides a natural laboratory in which to examine the source of cost
savings.
We conclude that managed care has slowed the growth of medical
costs. States with high managed-care enrollment have significantly
lower cost growth than states with lower managed-care enrollment.
Managed care most affects hospital spending growth. Increased spend-
ing on physicians offsets some of the reduced hospital spending
growth, but we typically find a net reduction in total spending growth.
Perhaps more importantly, we find suggestive evidence that managed
care may be reducing the diffusion of new medical technologies. States
with high managed-care enrollment were technology "leaders" in the
early 1980s but were only average in their use of technology in the
early 1990s. This suggests that managed care may have a significant
effect on the long-run growth of medical costs.
I. The Growth of Aggregate Medical Spending
We begin by analyzing recent changes in national health expenditures
to examine whether there is any relation between increased competi-
tion and reduced medical spending growth. Figure 3.1 shows the
growth of real, per capita national health expenditures for various time
periods from 1960 through 1995. (Throughout the chapter, dollar
amounts in real terms are adjusted using the GDP deflator for personal
consumption expenditures.) Between 1960 and 1990, medical expendi-
tures grew about 5% per year in real, per capita terms. The growth rate
varied by decade. In the 1960s, growth was rapid, as Medicare and
Medicaid were created and insurance coverage for the privately in-
sured became more generous. In the 1970s, the medical sector consoli-
dated and growth rates ebbed. The 1980s were marked by the first
serious efforts at cost containment, including prospective payment for
hospitals in the public sector and some of the private sector. But overall
cost growth continued relatively unabated.
In the 1990s, however, and particularly since 1992, the growth of
medical costs has slowed dramatically. In 1992, medical spending grew
4.8%. In 1993, growth was 3.1%; in 1994, it was 1.5%; and in 1995, it
was 2.1%. This reduction in growth is particularly surprising given the
ongoing economic expansion of the post-1992 period. (As we show
below, the elasticity of medical spending with respect to income is












































































































Growth of medical spending by service, 1990-1995
To offer more insight into why medical expenditure increases have
been so low, figure 3.2 shows the growth in medical spending by
service from 1990 to 1995. Acute-care spending (hospitals, physicians,
and prescription drugs) has grown most slowlyeach category about
2.5% per year. Together, these services account for about two-thirds of
medical costs. Other professional services, long-term care services, and
other spending have slowed by much less.
II. The Managed Care Explanation
A common depiction in newspapers and professional journals is that
increased enrollment in managed care has resulted in the reduction
in spending growth. The insurance environment has changed enor-
mously over the past several years. In 1980, about 5% of the privately
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insured population was in managed care.2 By 1987, managed care
accounted for about one-quarter of the privately insured population
(Gabel et al. 1987); today more than three-quarters of the privately
insured population is enrolled in managed care (Jensen et al. 1997).
Of course, many types of health insurance plans fall under the rubric
of "managed care." A fee-for-service plan with some utilization re-
view, for example, may call itself a managed-care plan. Still, the change
in plan enrollments has been impressive. Enrollment in the most
restrictive form of managed carehealth maintenance organizations
[HMOs]rose from 16% of insured workers in 1987 to 48% in 1995
(including point-of-service plans).3 Enrollment in preferred provider
organizations [PPOS], the next-most-restrictive form of managed care,
rose from 11% in 1987 to 25% in 1995.
Managed care can reduce medical cost growth through three mecha-
nisms. First, managed care might negotiate price reductions. Because
much of a physician's earnings are a return on past investment,man-
aged care can often induce physicians to accept lower fees than they
would otherwise have charged. The same is true for prescription
drugs, some hospital services, and some medical durables. These dis-
counts reduce medical costs.4 These will be one-time savings: As prices
fall, medical spending growth will slow, but after the return to past
investment has been squeezed out, medical costs will resume their
increase.
Managed care might also save money through one-time quantity
reductions. For example, managed-care insurers monitor very care-
fully the number of days that their enrollees are in the hospital. If stays
can be reduced by a day, costs fall.5 Again, however, these are likely
Even with the managed care available, there was little competition with indemnity
insurers. Employers often subsidized indemnity policies heavily, blunting the incentives
for FIMOs to limit spending.
The distinction between HMOs and other forms of managed care has become less
clear over time. In general, however, HMOs require participants to receive care from
particular providers and typically pay primaiy-care physicians on a salaiy or capitated
basis. Preferred provider organizations pay their providers on a discounted fee-for-serv-
ice basis but may also monitor physician behavior to exclude physicians who do not
keep utilization down. In both types of plans, cost sharing to the insured for using a
provider in the insurer's network is lower than for using providers outside the network.
These price reductions may have long-term effects on the supply of new physicians
or medical equipment, but we ignore that issue in this chapter.
Again, this change may have long-term effects on the number of hospitals, the
structure of the hospital industry, and the like, but for our purposes, we ignore these
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to be one-time savings. Lengths of stay can fall only so much; when
they cease falling, medical costs will continue to increase.
Finally, managed care might save money by reducing the rate of
technology expansionthe intensity with which a typical patient is
treated or the rate at which new technologies are adopted. We separate
this factor from the first two because of its importance in the long-run
growth of medical spending. Much research shows that the dominant
source of increasing medical costs over time is thedevelopment of new
medical technologies and the application of existing technologies to
new patients (Aaron 1991; Newhouse 1992;Cutler and McClellan
1996). If managed care reduces the expansion of technologies, it could
have a long-term effect on the growth of medical costs.
Quantity changes resulting from managed careeither one-time
savings or reductions in the rate of technology diffusionmay either
improve or reduce welfare. To the extent that managed care reduces
the resources needed to provide a given level of medical services, that
would be an efficiency savings to society. If managed care changes the
amount of services provided, however, welfare may either rise or fall,
depending on whether the services no longer provided were worth
more or less than their cost. In this chapter, we look only at theeffects
of managed care on overall resource utilization, without drawing
strong conclusions about the value of those changes.
Testing the Managed-Care Effect
One piece of evidence suggesting that managed care has reduced
national medical expenditures in the past few years is that managed-
care premiums are lower than premiums in traditionalindemnity
policies. A recent Foster Higgins report, for example, found that in
1995, costs for HMOs were either flat or declining, whereas costs for
traditional insurance continued to rise. Hay-Huggins reports that
HMO premiums are significantly lower than premiums for fee-for-
service insurance, although other surveys show smaller differences
(Krueger and Levy 1997). Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson (1995)
examine the impact of HMO concentration on changes in HMO pre-
miums and find that more HMO competition leads to lower HMO
premiums.
But this evidence is not conclusive. The fact that managed care
pays less than indemnity insurers does not mean that total medical84 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
spending is lower. Providers might simply reduce their costs to
managed-care insurers and raise them to indemnity insurers to offset
the managed-care discount. This type of substitution is broadly be-
lieved to occur when Medicare and Medicaid cut spending. Or man-
aged care might reduce spending for covered services, but spending
for uncovered services might rise. On the other hand, if competition
induces changes in practice styles so that 1-ilViOs have a moderating
effect on both HMO and traditional indemnity premiums,6 then com-
paring HMO to fee-for-service premiums may understate managed
care's impact on health expenditures.
We estimate the systemwide savings from managed care by looking
at overall medical spending growth in states where managed care is
more prevalent compared to states where managed care is less preva-
lent. If managed care reduces medical spending growth, this should be
apparent through such a comparison.
Figure 3.3 shows a first pass at this comparison. We show per capita
spending relative to the national average in California and Minne-
sotatwo states in the vanguard of the managed-care revolutionbe-
tween 1980 and 1993. In both states, spending growth was much lower
than the national average. In California, for example, per capita medi-
cal spending was 17% above the national average in 1980; by 1993
spending was equal to the national average. In Minnesota, medical
spending fell from 9% above the national average to 4% above the
national average over the same period.
Melnick and Zwanziger (1995) and Zwanziger and Melnick (1996)
compare in detail the experience of California with that of the rest of
the nation. They show that in the 1980s, spending on all acute-care
services rose less rapidly in California than in the nation as a whole, as
did numbers of full-time-equivalent hospital employees per patient
and the average length of a hospital stay.
To examine this issue more systematically, we use data on state
medical spending between 1980 and 1993 from the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration. (See Levit et al. (1995) for a description of the
data.) Unfortunately, no more recent data on cross-state spending are
available; thus, we cannot examine managed care's effects in the period
in which the national changes in spending were the greatest. We
6. For example, Wickizer and Feldstem (1995) found that premiums for fee-for-service
insurance were lower in areas with higher I-lIMO enrollment. Baker (1997) found that
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measure HMO enrollment as the average value, from 1980 to 1993,
of HMO enrollment per capita (HMO enrollment dataare from
Interstudy).
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the data. Theaverage state
had spending growth of 4.6% in realper capita terms between 1980
and 1993, with hospital spending growing less rapidly than physician
spending. HMO enrollment averaged 11.2%, but ranged from 0%to
28%. (HMO enrollment includes both "pure" enrollment (closed-panel
HMOs) and "open" enrollment (plans witha point-of-service option)).
Although there are many other forms of managedcare beyond HMOs,
consistent data on non-HMO managed care are not availableover time.
We also suspect that FIMO enrollment is correlated with managed-care
enrollment more generally. The states with the highest HMO enroll-
ments are California, Minnesota, Hawaii, Oregon, and Massachusetts.
Those with the lowest HMO enrollmentsare small or rural states such
as Alaska, Mississippi, and Wyoming, with no HMO enrollment or a
very small amount.
Figure 3.4 shows the national analog of figure 3.3. We graph the
changeinreal per capita medical expenditures for each state against
average HMO enrollment. The two have a clear negative relation,
consistent with the managed-care explanation. States with high HIMO
enrollment had less-rapid spending growth. The correlation between
cost growth and HMO enrollment, shown in the bottom of table 3.1, is
.6. And a simple regression equation gives a large magnitude: Each
ten-percentage-point increase in HMO enrollment reduces cost growth
by .6 percentage points annually.7
Before being convinced by figure 3.4, however,we must question
why managed-care enrollment is so high insome states and so low in
others. Both managed-care enrollment and subsequent spending
growth may respond to a third factorthe initial level of medical
spending in the state. In states where costs are high, managedcare will
enroll new members more easily than in states where theyare low. But
this relationship is problematic if states with high medicalcosts natu-
rally would have had less-rapid growth of medical costs in the future,
perhaps because other states would catch up to theirmore advanced
7. All of our correlations and regressions weight the observations by population. With-
out such weighting, HMOs would not have as large or significant an effecton expendi-
tures (both because states like Alaska, Nevada, and Hawaii are outliers but havevery
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Figure 3.4
HMO enrollment and the growth of medical spending, 1980-1993
medical practices. Indeed, as figure 3.3 showed, medical expenditures
in California slowed just enough to bring California spending back to
the national average from the extremely high levels observed in the
early 1980s.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 suggest this is a more general phenomenon.
Figure 3.5 shows the relation between per capita medical spending in
1980 and average HIv1O enrollment between 1980 and 1993. Initial
spending and managed-care enrollment are positively related; the
correlation between them, shown in table 3.1, is .73. Figure 3.6 shows
that initial medical spending is also associated with reductions in the
growth of future medical spending. Again, the correlation is large
(.53).
The important question, then, is whether managed-care enrollment
really reduces the growth rate of medical spending or whether it
instead proxies for states with high initial spending, which naturally
have less rapid growth rates over time. In the next section, we address
this issue.
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Figure 3.5
Initial medical spending and average subsequent HMO enrollment
III. Explaining State Cost Growth
To estimate the effect of managed care on the growth of state medical
costs, we consider the regression analogue to figure 3.4:
pending5 =HMO Enrollment5 + X513 +, (3.1)
where s denotes states and the dependent variable is the annualized
growth rate of real, per capita medical spending in the state from 1980
to 1993. f3i is the effect of HMO enrollment on annual cost growth.
We examine managed care's impact on a number of components of
spendingtotal medical spending, spending on hospitals, spending on
physicians, and spending on prescription drugs. We also examine its
impact separately on Medicare and non-Medicare expenditures. Ideal-
ly, we would like to measure managed care's impact on the per capita
spending of privately insured individuals, but those data are not
available. Non-Medicare expenditures are a decent proxy, but in ad-
dition to the health expenditures of privately insured individuals,
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Figure 3.6
Reversion of medical spending
elderly and the uninsured and expenditures paid by Medicaid or other
government programs.
It is not clear whether the level or the change in HMO enrollment
should be related to the growth of spending. In theory, the level of
managed care could affect both the level of spending, through one-
time efficiency gains or reimbursement cuts (so the change in HMO
enrollment would be related to the change in spending), or the growth
rate of spending, by changing the speed at which technology is
adopted (so the level of HMO enrollment would explain changes in
spending). In practice, however, the one-time effects of high HMO
enrollment likely occur over a number of years, so that the level of
managed-care enrollment in a state is likely to affect the growth rate of
spending regardless of whether HMOs affect technology adoption.
Further, the change in HMO enrollment might affect spending only
with a lag. For these reasons, we have decided to use the average level
of HMO enrollment over the period in our regressions. As figure 3.7
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Figure 3.7
Level and growth of LIMO enrollment
shows, however, the change in HMO enrollment is closely correlated
with the level of HMO enrollment in 1980; in general, our results hold
equally well when we use the change in HMO enrollment instead of
the level.8
The other right-hand-side variables included in the regression are
the change in per capita income, because people with higher incomes
spend more on health care (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment
Group 1993), and demographic controls (the change in fraction of the
population 18 or younger and the change in fraction of the population
65 or older).
8. The level of HMO enrollment has a sufficiently high correlation with its growth rate
that the standard errors increase substantially when we include both in the regression
simultaneously.92 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
Table 3.2 presents regression results for total health spending over
1980-93. The first four columns show figures without controlling for
initial spending; the second four columns include such controls. In
general, the coefficients on the control variables are as we would
expect. Income growth is positively related to spending growth; the
elasticity is about 1. An increasing share of older people is associated
with increased medical spending, whereas an increasing share of
younger people has no effect on spending growth.
The first row shows the effect of HMO enrollment on cost growth.
When initial spending levels are not controlled, HMOs have a sig-
nificant negative effect on total health spending. Every ten-percentage-
point increase in HMO enrollment reduces the growth of health
expenditures by 3 percentage points per year.9 The effect works only
through hospital spendingincreased HMO enrollment is actually
associated with increased spending on physicians and prescription
drugs.
Consistent with our figures above, controlling for initial spending
reduces HMOs' impact on cost growth. Initial spending has a strong
negative effect on subsequent spending growth; each 10% increase in
spending in 1980 is associated with cost growth between 1980 and 1993
that is .2 percentage points below average. Whatever the source of this
convergence, it is not a new phenomenon. As reported in table 3.3,
growth of medical expenditures across states exhibited the same pat-
tern from 1966 to 1980. Controlling for this phenomenon is important
and affects our estimates of managed care's impact on health costs.
Returning to table 3.2, when we control for initial spending, the coe-
fficient of HMO enrollment on total spending is still negative (.014)
but not statistically significant. Even in this case, however, HMOs are
still associated with a reduction in hospital spending; the coefficient is
large (.052) and statistically significant. But HMOs also have a posi-
tive, large, statistically significant impact on physician spending.
Clearly, one of managed care's major effects is to shift the site of care
from the hospital to the physician's office or clinic (see Reinhardt 1996
for a discussion of this trend). As shown in figure 3.8, states with high
HMO enrollments spend much less of their medical dollars in the
9. An alternative way to see this effect is to regress the logarithm of medical spending
in each year on HMO enrollment that year and the control variables for that year. If we
do this, we obtain a coefficient on HMO enrollment of .688 (.214) in 1980 and .198 (.125)
in 1993. The reduction in the coefficient on HMO enrollment is consistent with the
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Table 3.3




Note: Data are for 50 states (excluding the District of Columbia). All changes are from 1966
to 1980. Initial medical spending is in 1966. Medical spending and income are in real, per
capita terms and growth rates are annualized. Regressions are weighted by state population
in 1980.
hospital. HMO coverage does not affect the share of spending on
drugs; most of the offset is on physicians. HMOs' large impact on
physician spending is somewhat surprising and is worthy of further
investigation.10
Table 3.4 shows regression analogous to those in table 3.2 for non-
Medicare expenditures. The results are very similarwhen we do not
control for initial spending, HMOs reduce total and hospital spending
but increase physician and prescription drug spending. When initial
spending is included, HIvlOs have no significant effect on total health
spending but shift spending from hospitals to physicians.
Table 3.5 examines managed care's effect on Medicare expenditures
per elderly person. (Because Medicare does not pay for prescription
drug coverage, only the physician and hospital results are presented.)
Controlling for initial spending, the results indicate that states with
high HMO enrollment (mostly of the non-Medicare population) have
10. Simon and Emmons (1997) find that physicians who are paid through capitation
often do not purchase reinsurance. It is possible, then, that payments to physicians
increase under managed care because physicians take on increased risk. Alternatively,
some physician spending could actually be hospital spending, but under systems of
capitated payments, the two may be hard to distinguish.
Personal income .213-.161 1.173 .575
(.163)(.208) (.279) (.173)
APercentage of population younger than 19 -.036 .122 -.482 .035
(.074) (.097) (.129) (.092)
iWercentage of population older than 64 .309 .400 .164 .143
(.087)(.113) (.148) (.106)
ln(initial medical spending) -.018-.021 -.006 -.042
(.005)(.005) (.007) (.007)
Summary statistics
N 50 50 50 50
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Figure 3.8
Managed care and the share of spending on hospitals
lower hospital spending growth, although the coefficient is not sig-
nificant at a 10% level. HMOs have no measured effect on physicians.
Because enrollment in managed care was a very small share of total
Medicare enrollment in this time period, the effect of managed care on
Medicare costs is not a direct effect of managed care enrollment for that
group. Instead, two effects might be at work. First, to the extent that
managed care affects hospital or physician practices, states with a high
rate of HMO enrollment might also have lower Medicare expenditures.
Second, HMOs may reduce the amount of "cost-shifting" from Medi-
care to private insurance, which would show up as lower overall
spending and probably fewer services to the Medicare population.
Further work could usefully distinguish between these effects.
Our analysis to this point raises two issues. First, the health care
market has changed significantly in recent years (although some may
argue that most of the changes have occurred in the years since 1993,
for which expenditure data across states are not yet available), and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































098 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
HMOs may have had increasing effects over time.11 Second, these
regressions ignore another major innovation in hospital financing that
occurred in the 1980sthe introduction of prospective payment in
Medicare. To the extent that prospective payment equalized payments
across states (moving from a payment method that relied on reason-
able costs to one of fixed payments per diagnosis), this would affect
hospital spending as well. Because high-HMO states were also high-
cost states, this may be negatively correlated with HMO enrollment.
To control for both of these issues, we reestimate the regressions for
1988-93 only. By 1988, prospective payment was fully phased in and
managed care was well underway. Thus, this time period might be
more indicative of a true managed-care effect than 1983-88. Tables
3.6-3.8 present the results. The results for total spending growth,
shown in table 3.6, indicate that managed care is more effective at
controlling costs in the later period than in the earlier period; there is
a greater negative effect on hospital spending growth and a smaller
positive effect on physician spending growth.12 The overall effect is a
decline of .5 percentage points per year in total health expenditures for
every ten-percentage-point increase in the HMO enrollment rate, a
large effect and significantly different from zero. Table 3.7 shows
similar results for private spending growth, although the positive
effect of managed care on physician spending is larger and more
significant. Table 3.8 shows that the results for Medicare growth again
suggest a managed-care effect, but the coefficients are smaller and less
significant over 1988-93 than over the entire 1980-93 period. This
might indicate some confounding effects from the introduction of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in the first part of the
sample.
Overall, the cross-state evidence points to managed care as an im-
portant factor in the recent decline in health costs. Over the entire
period from 1980 to 1993, we find that increases in physician spending
nearly fully offset reductions in hospital spending. When we look at
the most recent period, however, we find reductions in hospital spend-
ing only partly offset by increased physician spending. Our results
suggest that a 10% increase in HMO enrollment reduces the growth of
hospital spending by about 0.5% and that of overall medical costs
Gabel (1997) surveys the changes in HMOs that occurred in the 1990s.
Simon and Born (1996) find that managed care had no significant impact on physi-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2102 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
by about 0.4%. These results are generally robust to a number of
controls, including income, demographics, and the initial level of state
spending.
IV. Explaining the Reduction in Hospital Costs
To predict the longer-run effects of managed care, it is important to
know not only whether managed care has affected medical spending,
but how it has done so. Has managed care simply extracted rents from
providersreducing payments for procedures or cutting back at the
margins? Or has there been a more significant change in the medical
environment. In this section, we examine changes in hospital costs to
address this issue.
We start with an accounting identity. Per capita spending on hospi-
tal care is the product of spending per day in the hospital times the















The growth of medical spending per capita can therefore be decom-
posed into the growth of each of these terms.
The first rows of table 3.9 show regression equations for the growth
of hospital spending per adjusted admission and adjusted admissions
per capita.13 Adjusted admissions are hospital admissions plus a factor
to account for outpatient services provided, so that this figure approxi-
mates the total amount of hospital care provided. As the first row
shows, HMOs have no significant effect on adjusted admissions per
capita. The implication, shown in the second row, is that the entire
decline in hospital growth associated with HMOs comes from a reduc-
tion in costs per admission. Decomposing this factor into days of care
and costs per day (the next four rows) reveals that most of the reduc-
tion in the costs per admission comes from a reduction in the length of
hospital stays. On average, a ten-percentage-point increase in the frac-
13. The coefficients shown in the table are those on the average HMO enrollment and
those on the initial hospital spending, but the regressions also include the change in per
capita income and the change in the population shares of old and young.Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures 103
Table 3.9
HMO enrollment and components of hospital spending
Note: All regressions include change in real per capita income and changes in fraction of
















Adjusted admissions per person .018 .011 .019 .014
(.013) (.004) (.017) (.006)
Cost per adjusted admission -.065 -.030 -.093 -.017
(.016) (.005) (.034) (.013)
Length of stay per admission
All -.053 -.006 -.080 .006
(.021) (.007) (.025) (.009)
Private -.716 -.084 -.417 .035
(.378) (.125) (.178) (.067)
Medicare -.551 -.123 -.283 -.012
(.221) (.073) (.156) (.058)
Costs per inpatient day -.013 -.023 -.013 -.021
(.022) (.007) (.027) (.010)
Adjusted days per person -.033 .003 -.061 .018
(.022) (.007) (.025) (.009)
Outpatient visits per person -.053 .029 .026 .077
(.038) (.012) (.058) (.022)
Full-time hospital employees -.060 -.006 -.056 -.006
per person (.018) (.006) (.025) (.010)
Hospital beds per person -.045 .003 -.076 .019
(.017) (.006) (.028) (.010)104 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
tion of the population enrolled in HMOs leads to lengths of stay
declining 0.5 percentage points faster per year. HMOs have a negative
but insignificant effect on the average cost per day in the hospital.
The finding that all of the cost savings are in shorter hospital stays
may be somewhat misleading. Because the amount of care given to a
patient likely declines with additional days in the hospital, one might
have expected states that experienced a greater reduction in length of
stay to have shown an increase in the average cost per day. When
controlling for length of stay, HMO enrollment does reduce cost per
day.14
Direct measures of hospital resource utilization also vary with man-
aged care. On average, states with a large fraction of their populations
enrolled in HMOs have slower growth of hospital employees per
person and less bed growth per person.
The table's right columns show the results for 1988-93. HMOs have
a slightly larger effect on costs per admission in this period relative to
the whole time period, consistent with our earlier results. Also, total
days in the hospital (including an adjustment for outpatient visits)
have declined significantly more in states with high HMO enrollment,
although again HMOs have not significantly affected the costs per
inpatient day. Length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries in this post-
PPS adjustment period have also declined in states with high HMO
enrollment, again indicating that changes in hospital practice styles
have spillover effects.
V. Changes in Technology Adoption
We are particularly interested in the extent to which managed care has
reduced the diffusion of medical technology, because that directly
measures its long-run impact on cost growth. We thus examine this
issUe in some detail, using data on the adoption of specific technologies
across states from the American Hospital Association's [AHAI annual
survey, which asks whether hospitals have acquired a variety of im-
portant and expensive technologies. We analyze survey responses for
14. When the change in the length of stay is included in the regression, the effect of a
ten-percentage-point increase in HIvlO enrollment is to reduce the growth of costs per
day by 0.5 percentage points per year. Over 1988-93, however, the effect of HMO
enrollment on costs per day is only about half this magnitude and is statistically
insignificant.Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures 105
1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 to look at how managed-care enrollment
affects technology diffusion over time.15
Our ideal measure of technology diffusion is the rate at which
particular technologies are used for patients with similar clinical con-
ditions. The AHA does not ask about technology use, however, only
whether the hospital owns the technology. We thus use as our measure
of technology diffusion the number of units of each technology per
million persons in the state.16 If all units perform roughly the same
number of procedures, this accurately measures technology diffusion.
If managed care consolidates technologies into some hospitals and
keeps it out of other hospitals, however, we might find that managed
care reduces technology's availability when in fact it does not reduce
its actual utilization. Unfortunately, there is no way to surmount this
issue without detailed information that we do not have on the use of
particular procedures.
Table 3.10 shows the range of technologies we analyze, which are in
five groups: cardiac technologies (catheterization lab, open-heart sur-
gery facilities, and angioplasty facilities); radiation therapy(megavol-
tage radiation, radioactive implants, therapeutic radioisotope, X-ray
therapies, and stereotactic radiosurgeiy); diagnostic radiology (CT
scanner, diagnostic radioisotope, MRI, ultrasound, positron emis-
sion tomography [PET], and single photon emission computed tomog-
raphy [SPECT]); transplantation services (kidney, organ [other than
kidney], tissue, bone marrow); and other (extracorporeal shock wave
lithotripter).
Perhaps more important than their grouping by service, however,
our data are a mix of diffusing technologies and technologies that have
already diffused. Catheterization labs, for example, go from four per
million in 1980 to seven per million by 1995; CT scanners go from five
per million in 1980 to twenty per million in 1995. Other technologies,
such as radioactive implants and ultrasound machines, had already
diffused by this time period. We classify the technologies that are
diffusing over our time period into one group (the diffusing sample):
If a hospital does not respond to the AHA survey in some year, it has missing data
about technologies. We use data on the previous four years of responses to impute
technology ownership, where possible.
An alternative measure of technology availability would be the share of hospitals
with a particular technology. This would be particularly sensitive to changes in the
number of hospitals, however, which our earlier results suggest managed care affects.
We thus do not use this measure.106 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
Table 3.10
Diffusion of medical technologies
Units per million people
Cardiac
Catheterization 4.1 4.6 6.2 6.8
Open-heart surgery 2.7 3.0 3.7 4.0
Angioplasty 4.6 4.7
Radiation therapy --- 5.0
Megavoltage radiation 3.8 4.1 4.2
Radioactive implants 5.9 5.9 5.1
Therapeutic radioisotope 6.8 6.1 5.6
X-ray therapy 5.5 4.4 4.0
Stereotactic radiosurgery 1.1
Diagnostic radiology
CT scanner 5.2 13.3 17.7 19.7
Diagnostic radioisotope 18.7 17.0 16.0 14.0
MRI 1.2 4.3 9.5
Ultrasound 21.4 24.6 23.3
PET scanner 0.4 0.6
SPECT scanner 4.2 7.2
Transplant services -- - 2.0
Kidney transplant 0.7 0.8 0.9
Other organ transplant 1.0 1.1 1.1
Tissue transplant 1.2-
Bone marrow transplant - 0.7-
Lithotripter 0.2 1.4 3.1
Note: Data on ownership are from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. The
maximum number of units per million is 31.4 in 1980, 29.5 in 1985, 27.3 in 1990, and 24.5 in
1995.
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catheterization, open-heart surgery, angioplasty, megavoltage radia-
tion, stereotactic radiosurgery, CT scanners, MRIs, PET scanners,
SPECT scanners, transplant services, and lithotripters. The other tech-
nologies (radioactive implants, therapeutic radioisotopes, X-ray ther-
apy, and diagnostic radioisotopes) we classify as already diffused.
In addition to the distinction between diffusing and already-diffused
technologies, we also have variation within the diffusing technologies
in time of introduction. For example, angioplasty was about as dif-
fused in 1990 as cardiac catheterization was in 1980; SPECT scanners
in 1990 were about as diffused as CT scanners in 1980. Thus, we can
look at how managed care has changed over time the diffusion of
technologies in the same state of overall diffusion.
To examine the relation between managed-care enrollment and tech-
nology adoption in 1980, we estimate models similar to our previous
analysis:
/ Units')
Million'- 31HMOEnrollments + X 13+, (3.3)
where s indexes states. As control variables (X), we include the loga-
rithm of per capita income in the state, the percentage of the popula-
tion living in urban areas, and the logarithm of state population.17 As
before, all regressions are weighted by state population.
The first column of table 3.11 shows estimates of equation (3.3). We
report only the coefficient on the HMO enrollment variable. In general,
the other variables are as we would expect: States with higher incomes
have increased technology diffusion, and more-urban areas have less
technology diffusion (reflecting shorter commuting times). As popula-
tion increases, so does the number of units of technology per million.
The table's first row shows that for all of the technologies, HMO
enrollment has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on tech-
nology diffusion. Each ten-percentage-point increase in HMO enroll-
ment raises the ownership of the average technology by 0.2 units per
million people. The next two rows show that this effect is very different
for the diffusing technologies relative to those already diffused.
Among the diffusing technologies, HMO enrollment is associated with
more technology ownership. The coefficient is positive and statistically
significant. Among already diffused technologies, in contrast, HMO
17. We experimented with other population characteristics but found they were not
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HMO enrollment, 1980
Figure 3.9
HMO enrollment and the diffusion of cardiac catheterization labs, 1980
enrollment has an insignificant negative effect on the ownership of
technology.
The insignificant effect of HIIVIOs on already-diffused technologies
suggests that HMO enrollment is not associated with long-run differ-
ences in technology availability across states. This makes sense; tech-
nologies available for some time have spread more or less equally
among all states. But states with high HMO enrollment in 1980 are
technology leadersnew technologies are more common there than in
other states.
Figure 3.9 shows this graphically by depicting the relation between
HMO enrollment and cardiac catheterization units in 1980. States like
California and Hawaii, leaders in managed-care enrollment, also have
high numbers of catheterization units. HMO enrollment is positively
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We want to know how the HMO coefficient changes over time. If
managed care is reducing the diffusion of new technologies, the HMO
coefficient should fall in the later years of the sample. There is a
problem, however, in simply estimating equation (3.3) for different
years. Our results for 1980 suggest that some states are naturally
technology leaders and others are technology "followers." If we want
to look at managed care's effect on technology diffusion, we need to
control for whether the state is a technology leader.18 That is, we need
to modify equation (3.3) to:
Units '
Million- I31HMOEnrollment5 + I32Technology Leader5 + x, f3 + E,.(3.4)
Here, fi gives HMO enrollment's effect on technological availability,
controlling for the fact that some states are naturally leaders and others
are followers.
There is clearly no variable for technology leadership. But our data
suggest a natural proxy: We take all of the diffusing technologies in
1980 and normalize the ownership variables so that they have a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one.19 We then add the normalized
ownership measures across the different technologies. The result is a
measure of the state's propensity to own high-tech medical services in
1980, which we use as a proxy for technology leadership.
The second through fifth columns of table 3.11 show estimates of
equation (3.4) in 1990 and 1995. We report only the coefficients on
HMO enrollment and the technology leadership variable, although the
logarithm of per capita income, the share of the state living in urban
areas, and the logarithm of state population are also included in the
regression.
Increased HMO enrollment is associated with less-rapid diffusion of
new technologies in 1990 and 1995, and this effect is increasing over
time. As the first row shows, states that were technology leaders
in 1980 are more likely to adopt new technologies in the 1990s.
The coefficient on the leadership variable is positive and statistically
In examining the managed care's impact on technology adoption, Chernew, Fen-
drick, and Mirth (1997) examined whether a new gallbladder surgery, laparoscopic
cholecystectomy, diffused more slowly within HMOs. They found little difference be-
tween HMOs and the general population in the rate of growth in utilization. However,
they were not able to control for this "leader effect," which might have led to their
results.
That is, we form z, = (units/million, - It) / a, where II is the mean ownership across
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HMO enrollment, 1990
Figure 3.10
HM0 enrollment and the diffusion of angioplasty labs, 1990
significant. Conditional on this effect, however, increased HMO enroll-
ment significantly reduces the propensity of states to adopt new tech-
nologies. Further, the coefficient on 1-IMO enrollment is more negative
in 1995 than in 1990, suggesting that HMO enrollment is increasingly
affecting the diffusion of new technologies over time. This finding is
not just a result of the fact that technologies are on average older in the
1990s than in 1980. Even for the new technologies of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, such as angioplasty, PET scanners, SPECT scanners, and
lithotripters, the coefficients on 1-IMO enrollment are generally nega-
tive and often statistically significant.
Figure 3.10 shows one particular example graphically by depicting
the relation between HMO enrollment in 1990 and the number of
angioplasty units per million people. Angioplasty in 1990 is roughlyManaged Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures 113
the technological equivalent to cardiac catheterization in 1980; both are
procedures used in the treatment of severe coronary problems. Thus,
the comparison between figures 3.9 and 3.10 implicitly reveals HMOs'
effect on similar technologies over time. As figure 3.10 shows, there is
essentially no relation between HMO enrollment and angioplasty
units. Even though the high managed-care states in 1980 are generally
the high managed-care states in 1990, those states are not the ones
where technology is diffusing most rapidly. California, for example, is
only average in angioplasty units, and Massachusetts, another high
HMO state, is below average. When we control for the fact that these
states were technology leaders in 1980, our regressions in table 3.11
indicate a negative and statistically significant effect of managed care
on technology diffusion.
In principle, managed care might affect different types of technolo-
gies differently. Technologies that save money might be adopted more
readily in heavy managed-care states, whereas technologies that add
to costs should diffuse less rapidly. We find it difficult to analyze this
in our data, however; a more systematic study of this issue would be
needed to reach firm conclusions.
VI. Conclusion
The differences across states in the pervasiveness of managed care has
allowed us to examine managed care's effects on health care systems
looking not only at the insurance premiums those in managed care pay
or the reimbursement providers receive from managed-care compa-
flies but at managed care's total impact on health expenditures. The
results are fairly encouraging.2° The higher is HMO enrollment in a
state, the lower is the growth of hospital spending. Over the entire
1980-93 period, an equal increase in physician and drug spending
almost negated the reduction in hospital cost growth. However, in
1988-93, the increase in physician spending was much more muted,
and managed care reduced the growth rate not only of hospital spend-
ing, but of spending overall.
Managed care's impact on physician spending was a surprise to us,
and it warrants further investigation. Its impact on hospitals was more
in line with anecdotal evidencemanaged care reduced hospital costs
20. Of course, without a measure of health outcomes, it is impossible to determine
whether managed care is worth its cost.114 David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner
primarily by reducing the length of stay in the hospital, leading to
fewer hospital employees per person as well as fewer hospital beds.
Perhaps more important than the finding that managed care reduces
health spending overall is the preliminary evidence that managed care
may also slow the rate of adoption of new technologies. States with
high enrollment in HMOs used to be the first to adopt new technolo-
gies; now, they are only average. Because rapid adoption of new
technology is believed to be one of the main factors behind the rise in
health expenditures, the finding that HMOs can reduce technology
adoption means that managed care may actually moderate the long-
term growth of health expenditures. That is a subject well worth
further investigation.
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